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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I explore two strands of research: in the first half I explore the effects 
of language learning on brain structure and cognitive function. In the second half 
I study to what extent educational attainment alter the rate of cognitive decline 
in old age. These different strands of research are united through the concept of 
brain plasticity, which is the brain’s ability to change its structural configuration 
in response to new experiences. 
In Study I we charted the neural underpinning of foreign language learning in a 
sample of younger adults. A total of 56 younger adults were randomized to either 
a 10-week beginner’s course in Italian or a control condition. For those studying 
Italian we found that grey-matter change in the right hippocampus was associ-
ated with how much time they spent practicing, rather than with how good they 
became suggesting that effort, rather than achieved proficiency, is what drives 
neuroplastic change. 
Study II presents the largest (to date) randomized trial looking into the causal effects 
of language learning as cognitive engagement in older age, specifically foreign 
language learning. 160 people between ages 65 and 75 were randomized to either 
an 11-week beginner’s course in Italian, or an 11-week relaxation training course. 
While we predicted that language learning would improve cognitive function, 
specifically associative memory, we found no evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Study III and IV address the question of whether or not educational attainment 
affects the rate of cognitive decline in old age. While it is clear that educational 
attainment is associated with level of cognitive function, we find no evidence 
that it alters the rate of decline in old age. Study III address this question using a 
novel statistical approach while Study IV presents a meta-analysis on the subject, 
arriving at similar conclusions. 
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11 INTRODUCTION
Decline of cognitive functioning is a hallmark symptom of aging, and while most 
experience some alteration in old age not everyone is affected equally. Pathological 
manifestations of cognitive impairment, such as Alzheimer’s disease, severely 
limit the independence and capabilities of the afflicted patients, but age-related 
cognitive decline is also a natural consequence of healthy aging. As this process 
may start long before any manifest symptoms occur it is important to understand 
what factors predict age-related cognitive decline in order to identify those at risk. 
Another question is if, or rather what we can do about this process once it has 
started, i.e. if the process is at all reversible, and if so, how? 
1.1 Cognitive functioning across the life span
The umbrella term ‘cognitive functions’ refers to brain-based behavioral abilities 
we use to carry out everyday tasks. Of focal interest for the present thesis are fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, episodic memory, associative memory and 
working memory. Fluid intelligence refers to reasoning, abstract thinking, and 
 pattern recognition (e.g. the ability to see similarities between distinct phenomena), 
and is involved in solving problems with which we have little or no prior experi-
ence. Fluid intelligence is also stable predictor of educational success (Rohde & 
Thompson, 2007), mortality risk (Aichele, Rabbitt, & Ghisletta, 2015) and every-
day functioning in old age (Tucker-Drob, 2011) and exhibits strong age-related 
decline beginning in early adulthood (Rönnlund, Nyberg, Bäckman, & Nilsson, 
2005; Salthouse, 2009). Crystallized intelligence refers to the ability to apply 
already acquired knowledge in familiar situations, such as factual knowledge and 
reading comprehension (Cattell, 1963). Crystallized intelligence is strongly asso-
ciated with educational attainment (Gerstorf, Ram, Hoppmann, Willis, & Schaie, 
2011) and, in contrast to fluid intelligence, remain relatively preserved even into 
old age (Rönnlund, Nyberg, Bäckman, & Nilsson, 2005). According to Cattell’s 
investment theory of intelligence (Cattell, 1963) fluid intelligence is invested early 
on in order to acquire skills and abilities, which subsequently become crystallized. 
One example of such an ability is reading comprehension. Working memory refers 
to the limited capacity to maintain, manipulate and update information in short-
term memory (Baddeley, 1992), such as remembering a telephone number. Like 
fluid intelligence, working memory begin to decline in early adulthood. Episodic 
memory refers to the encoding and retrieval of declarative memories with spatio-
temporal characteristics, such as autobiographical memories (Tulving, 1972). 
Episodic memory is a function of two distinct memory systems: item memory, 
involving the recollection of single items (e.g. a face or a name), and associative 
memory, involved in the binding of two distinct pieces of information (e.g. the 
pairing of a name with a face; Davachi, 2006). Episodic memory also exhibits 
marked age-related decline (Rönnlund et al., 2005). Associative memory also 
2exhibits marked age-related decline, whereas item memory is relatively preserved 
even in older age. Thus, age-related decline in episodic memory may be due to a 
selective deficiency in associative memory (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000). 
Cognitive aging has been studied using both cross-sectional designs, in which par-
ticipants of different ages are measured at one point in time, and longitudinal study 
designs, in which participants are measured repeatedly across multiple time points 
(Baltes, 1968; Schaie, 1965). Results from cross-sectional and longitudinal  studies 
on cognitive aging suggest somewhat different patterns of decline (Salthouse, 
2009; Schaie, 1994, 2005). Generally, cross-sectional studies suggest earlier 
onset and more rapid decline than longitudinal studies (Schaie, 1994). This can be 
partly explained by differences in design: while cross-sectional designs measure 
“change” as between-subject (interindividual) differences, longitudinal designs 
measure “change” as within-subject (intraindividual) differences, i.e. change over 
time. For example, observed age-related differences in cross-sectional research 
may partly reflect true age-related changes (i.e. changes that reflect the biologi-
cal process of aging), but may also be confounded by cohort effects (e.g. effects 
applying to everyone at the same time) or period effects (i.e. effects applying to 
everyone present at a point in time, such as wars, famine or changes in policy). 
Another source of variability is the so-called Flynn effect (Flynn, 1984), the fact 
that later generations tend to score higher than earlier generations on cognitive 
tests (Rönnlund & Nilsson, 2009). Proposed explanations for this include reduced 
family-size (Sundet, Eriksen, & Tambs, 2008), increased nutritional quality (Colom, 
Lluis-font, & Andre, 2005; Lynn, 1990), better access to and higher quality of 
schooling (Ceci, 1991; Lager, Seblova, & Falkstedt, 2016; Ritchie & Tucker-drob, 
2018), and an increased familiarity with cognitive testing (Neisser, 1997). This 
might reflect societal changes and improved living conditions. 
Teasing apart the different influences of age, period and cohort is a fundamental 
problem in longitudinal aging research (Schaie, 2007). They cannot all be  estimated 
simultaneously due to multicollinearity, i.e. one factor can be completely deter-
mined by the two others (for example, age = cohort + period). On the other hand, 
longitudinal designs might underestimate the true age-related change, e.g. due 
to learning effects of repeated testing (re-test effects; Salthouse, 2009), or suffer 
from selective attrition (e.g. that a continued participation in the study depends 
on the outcome of interest, such as health status or cognitive performance) which 
might produce biased estimates. The two designs can be fruitfully combined, e.g. 
by a cohort-sequential longitudinal designs in which multiple cohorts are followed 
over time while new cohorts are introduced at each new time point (Nilsson et al., 
1997; Schaie, 1965). These combine the relative advantages while offsetting the 
relative weaknesses of cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. 
A person’s cognitive performance can be described as a function of initial perfor-
mance at some time point (level) and change thereafter (slope). Consequently, it is 
3important to consider both factors associated with level and factors associated with 
slope (Ritchie et al., 2016) as both may contribute to the development of cognitive 
impairment: those with higher initial cognitive functioning will take longer to reach 
an impairment threshold, as will those with a slower rate of decline. For example, 
educational attainment has an established association with level of cognitive func-
tioning but not with rate of decline (Lenehan, Summers, Saunders, Summers, & 
Vickers, 2014; Zahodne et al., 2011) while both engagement in leisure activities 
and occupational complexity are associated both with level of cognitive functioning 
and rate of decline (Finkel, Andel, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2009; Köhncke et al., 2016).
1.2 Educational attainment and cognitive functioning
Formal schooling begins at an early age and extends through late adolescence, 
sometimes into early adulthood. For most of us school is, among other things, a 
place to learn new things. Educational attainment is also a stable predictor of a 
wide range of life outcomes. Of particular importance for the present thesis is the 
association between educational attainment and cognitive functioning. Educational 
attainment has a well-established association with level of cognitive functioning (e.g. 
Opdebeeck, Martyr, & Clare, 2015; Strenze, 2007) but the nature of this relation-
ship is unclear. One possibility is that subjects with higher innate  cognitive ability 
go on to pursue higher education (Kremen et al., 2019). Another possibility is that 
education has a causal influence on cognitive function, such that staying in school 
for longer increase cognitive function (Ceci, 1991; Ritchie & Tucker-drob, 2018). 
A third option is that the associations are explained by other variables associated 
with both intelligence and educational attainment, e.g.  parental socioeconomic sta-
tus. One may also speculate that the relationship between education and cognition 
changes over time, e.g. in response to societal changes or policy implementation. 
For example, the introduction or increase in mandatory schooling may truncate 
the distribution on the lower end of the spectrum, e.g. people who would have 
otherwise dropped out of school will stay in school up to the minimum required 
duration, even if more education does not bring additional cognitive benefits, thus 
obscuring the underlying relationship. It may also be that wider access to educa-
tion triggers reactive changes, such as altered requirements and altered educational 
content. This creates complex interactions between education, cohort effects and 
period effects, and which one of these scenarios – if any – is correct may have 
implications for shaping policy; if education has no causal effect on cognitive 
function then increasing mandatory schooling will not result in higher intelligence. 
Discerning the nature and direction of causal relationships is therefore of outmost 
importance. While conducting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are commonly 
viewed as the golden standard for causal inference, certain areas – such as edu-
cational policy – do not easily lend themselves to tightly controlled experiments. 
To circumvent this researcher may exploit natural variation in exposure, such as 
successive implementation of policy changes in different areas, to arrive at causal 
4conclusions. Using this design, Lager et al. (2016) showed that increasing man-
datory schooling by one year increased full-scale IQ by 0.75 points. Similarly, a 
meta-analysis by Ritchie & Tucker-Drob (2018) found that a one-year increase in 
schooling increased IQ by between 1 and 5 points. 
Educational attainment is also a central component of the concept of cognitive 
reserve (Stern, 2002, 2010). Cognitive reserve has been introduced to account for 
often observed discrepancy between predicted cognitive function, as expected from 
neuroanatomical and – histological samples, and the manifest cognitive function 
as assessed by psychological testing. Cognitive reserve comprises at least three 
distinct theoretical models. A passive reserve model suggest that different brains 
have different brain reserve capacity, manifested as brain volume or synapse count, 
and that brains with more brain reserve capacity are simply able to withstand more 
damage before exhibiting cognitive impairment (Stern, 2002). According to an 
active reserve model, the brain copes with brain injury through more efficient 
use of neural resources (cognitive reserve) or by differential recruitment of brain 
networks (compensation). 
These three models make different predictions regarding the role of educational 
attainment and cognitive decline. The active reserve model imply that higher 
educational attainment is associated with slower decline; the compensatory model 
suggest that higher educational attainment is associated with faster decline (but 
perhaps later onset); and the passive model suggest that education only has an effect 
on level of cognitive function but is unrelated to cognitive decline (Lenehan et al., 
2014). A narrative review by Lenehan et al. (2014) found somewhat conflicting 
evidence but generally favored the notion of passive cognitive reserve. Studies 
reporting either positive of negative effects of education on rate of decline suffer 
from methodological drawbacks in that they tend to use less sophisticated statis-
tical methods, have shorter follow-up periods or comprise samples of relatively 
low average educational attainment. Study III and Study IV in this thesis further 
investigate the role of educational attainment on cognitive decline. 
1.3 Brain plasticity
Brain plasticity refers to “the ability of the brain to change its structure in response 
to a mismatch between its capacity and the environmental demands” (Lövdén, 
Bäckman, Lindenberger, Schaefer, & Schmiedek, 2010). Within this framework 
plasticity denotes an increase in capacity, i.e. an increase in the range of func-
tional supply. This can be distinguished from flexibility, which is performance 
 variability within the limits of the functional range. A requirement for plastic 
changes is that they are reactive changes, in response to altered demands, and 
that they are associated with structural changes in the brain leading to increases in 
capacity. Flexible changes, on the other hand, do not require structural change but 
may be associated with mere functional changes, e.g. changes in neural activity. 
5A paradigmatic case of plastic change can be the brain’s response following brain 
injury. A stroke may disrupt neuronal tissue, which is followed by an immediate 
reduction the functional behavioral range (the capacity). The result is fewer avail-
able resources to meet demands which in turn puts a bigger stress on the system 
to carry out the same task. A sustained discrepancy between supply and demand 
may induce plastic changes, which over time may lead to structural changes, e.g. 
rewiring of white-matter tracts and volumetric changes in grey matter. Another 
example of brain plasticity is structural rewiring such as long-term potentiation 
(LTP) whereby synaptic connections between neuronal clusters are strengthened 
through repeated firing in response to a stimulus. Plastic changes is not expected 
to occur if the environmental demands lie within the current functional supply 
(i.e. if the organism can respond with existing flexibility) nor are they expected 
to occur if the environmental demands lie too far outside the current functional 
supply. In other words, the environmental demands cannot be too high nor too 
low, but must lie on the border of the current functional capacity in order to induce 
the necessary mismatch between capacity and demand to trigger plastic changes. 
This serves as a theoretical motivation behind adaptive cognitive training regimes, 
where task difficulty is altered depending on performance in order for the task to 
be suitably challenging. 
Thus, plastic changes may occur during skill acquisition and learning. But if learning 
leads to macroscopic structural changes in the brain, e.g. increases in grey-matter 
volume, how can the confines of a severely limited space, such as the human 
skull, allow for virtually infinite learning? The renormalization-expansion model 
of brain plasticity (Wenger, Brozzoli, Lindenberger, & Lövdén, 2017) accounts 
for this conundrum by applying Darwinian principles of evolution and selection to 
the developing brain. According to this model, plastic changes happen during dif-
ferent phases of expansion, selection and renormalization. When acquiring a new 
skill, a wide range of candidates (e.g. neurons, glial cells, synapses) are recruited 
and tested for their functional suitability in carrying out the proposed task. This 
over-recruitment leads to expansion of neural tissue, such as increases in cortical 
thickness or grey-matter volume. Next, there is a selection among all these pos-
sible candidates, where the most suitable candidates are developed further (e.g. 
axonal growth, dendritic branching) and maintained (e.g. through neurotrophic 
factors). Finally, unsuitable candidates wither and atrophy, leading to subsequent 
renormalization of neural tissue. 
A common method to study the human brain is through magnetic resonance  imaging 
(MRI). MRI is a non-invasive method used to obtain spatiotemporal (3D or 4D) 
images of human brain tissue, such as grey- or white matter, and has been used 
to study experience-dependent changes in the human brain. In a seminal study, 
Draganski et al. (2004) demonstrated increases in grey-matter volume in the 
medial temporal lobe following three months of juggling training. In a group of 
14 military interpreters, (Mårtensson et al. (2012) observed grey-matter increases 
6in the right hippocampus following three months of intense language studies. 
They also showed that structural growth in the middle frontal gyrus correlated 
with the amount of struggle experienced during language acquisition, suggesting 
plastic changes induced by prolonged mismatch between functional supply and 
environmental demands. 
1.4 Language learning and cognitive training
Longitudinal studies have established an association between cognitive function-
ing and engagement in cognitively stimulating activities in old age (Valenzuela & 
Sachdev, 2009; Köhncke et al., 2016). This raises prospect of improving cogni-
tive function by engaging in cognitively stimulating activities, such as cognitive 
training. Adaptive cognitive training paradigms involve effortful practice on a 
task specifically taxing one cognitive ability, such as a numerical updating task 
taxing working memory capacity, in which task difficulty is adjusted to match the 
participants’ performance, so as to always lie at the upper limit of the participants’ 
ability. Of particular interest is if and how improvements on the trained task (e.g. 
numerical updating) generalize to non-trained tasks (e.g. N-back) involving the 
same cognitive ability (“near-transfer”) and how they generalize to non-trained 
tasks (e.g. matrix reasoning) involving a different cognitive ability (“far-transfer”). 
Strategy-based training, which involves developing successful strategies to solving 
the particular task at hand, are not expected to exhibit far transfer to other domains 
while process-based training, which aims to improve the cognitive ability per se (e.g. 
improving working memory capacity), are. While the prospect of improving broad 
cognitive functions through deliberate practice might be intuitive, experimental 
evidence do not unanimously support this hypothesis. There is an on-going debate 
regarding the efficacy of cognitive training in facilitating far-transfer. So far, the 
evidence for far-transfer in older adults has been limited (Karbach & Verhaeghen, 
2014; Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013). 
Like cognitive training, foreign language learning is a cognitively challenging 
activity that has been proposed as another way of ameliorating cognitive decline 
in old age (Antoniou, Gunasekera, & Wong, 2013). Learning a foreign language 
involves engaging a wide range of cognitive abilities that are shown to be nega-
tively affected by aging (Antoniou et al., 2013; Raz et al., 2005): working memory 
is needed to keep and manipulate semantic information in short term memory, e.g. 
in applying new grammatical rules and forming sentences; inductive reasoning 
is involved in extending previously learnt rules to new cases; task switching in 
switching between the native tongue and the foreign language; and associative 
memory is involved when acquiring a foreign vocabulary. The last component 
of associative memory is what we utilize in Study I and II, where we model the 
acquisition of a foreign vocabulary as associative memory training, in which a 
familiar word in the speaker’s native tongue is repeatedly paired with a novel word 
in the target language (Breitenstein et al., 2005).
7Another line of argument comes from the observational evidence bilinguals tend to 
out-perform monolinguals on executive functioning measures, such as inhibition 
and task switching (Bialystok, Craik, & Luk, 2012). The proposed explanation 
for better executive functioning among bilinguals is that bilinguals have a higher 
cognitive load than monolinguals because they need to suppress one language 
in favor of the other (inhibition) and be able to quickly switch between the two 
 languages (task switching). This added cognitive load would accumulate over long 
periods of time, resulting in better cognitive functioning in old age – essentially 
exerting a natural instantiation of low-intensity cognitive training. However, the 
theory of bilingual advantage has been criticized lately (Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 
2015) arguing that observed benefits for bilinguals are a result of suboptimal sta-
tistical analyses or failure to control for important confounds. Further, it is also 
not obvious how any potential advantages from bilingualism would apply to foreign 
language learning in older age, unless such proficiency in the foreign language is 
acquired that it becomes a serious contender and to compete with the native  language, 
in order to induce the executive conflict. With this in mind, we are unsure of the 
validity of the literature on bilingual advantage, and question the relevance of it to 
foreign language learning in old age. 
Instead, we approach foreign language learning from a cognitive training per-
spective, specifically involving associative memory training. In contrast to item 
memory, which is relatively preserved in old age, associative memory shows 
marked age-related cognitive decline beginning around age 60 (Rönnlund et al., 
2005). The hippocampus, located in the medial temporal lobe, is a neural structure 
crucial for the successful encoding and retrieval of episodic memories (Burgess, 
Maguire, & Keefe, 2002; Penfield & Milner, 1958), and in particular in the binding 
of associative memories, such as during foreign language acquisition (Breitenstein 
et al., 2005). Hippocampus also exhibits substantial deterioration with increas-
ing age (Raz et al., 2005) and is a potential candidate where neurogenesis might 
occur (Kempermann, Song, & Gage, 2015). The exact relationship between asso-
ciative memory and hippocampal grey-matter volume in older age is unclear but 
some findings suggest that episodic memory functioning has an age gradient, in 
that older people rely more on frontal regions for memory encoding and retrieval 
than younger people, who rely more on hippocampal regions (Becker et al., 2015; 
Becker, Kalpouzos, & Salami, 2017). Within the framework of neuroplasticity 
suggested by Lövdén et al. (2010) one could speculate that foreign vocabulary 
acquisition through associative memory training would induce the required mis-
match between functional supply and environmental demands for neuroplastic 
changes in the hippocampus to occur. This is the theoretical basis for the language 
learning interventions in Study I and II.
82 AIMS
The present thesis contains two strands of research. The first half, studies I and 
II, are experimental studies investigating the effects of second-language learning 
in younger and older adults. The second part, studies III and IV, study cognitive 
decline across the life span and the moderating effects of educational attainment 
on the rate of decline. The concept of brain plasticity provides the theoretical 
framework against which this research can be understood.
93 SUMMARY OF STUDIES
3.1 Study I – Behavioral correlates of changes 
in  hippocampal gray matter structure during 
 acquisition of foreign vocabulary
Introduction. Human brain structure can change in response to altered environ-
mental demands. Earlier research has demonstrated growth in grey matter volume 
following motor skill coordination training such as juggling (Draganski et al., 2004) 
and growth in hippocampal grey matter volume following three months of intense 
language learning among military interpreters (Mårtensson et al., 2012) but it is 
unclear whether volumetric increases reflect achieved proficiency or duration of 
engagement. Acquisition of a foreign vocabulary can be modeled on an associa-
tive process whereby a novel word in the foreign language is repeatedly paired 
with a word in the mother tongue. As associative memory crucially involves the 
hippocampus we predict that changes in hippocampal grey-matter volume predict 
foreign language acquisition. 
Sample. 80 younger adults between ages 18-30 were recruited through ads in a 
local newspaper. 56 participants were randomized to a 10-week language learn-
ing course and 26 participants were randomized to an active control condition 
(watching Italian movies with Swedish subtitles). Participants were required to 
have no or minimal knowledge of any Roman languages. A total of 33 participants 
(61%) completed the language course and 23 participants (89%) completed the 
control condition. 
Materials and methods. Participants in the language course met in a group setting 
for 2.5 hours, once per week for 10 weeks. During classes participants focused 
on verbal communication exercises. Between classes, participants were instructed 
to practice vocabulary learning using an iOS app designed for this study consist-
ing of words from the course textbook. Participants in the control condition met 
once per week for 10 weeks and watched Italian movies with Swedish subtitles. 
Participants were tested using a computerized cognitive battery involving an 
associative memory task and a pattern separation task (delayed match-to-sample; 
DMS). At post-test, participants in the language learning condition did a vocabulary 
test of 100 words randomly selected from the app corpus. We also extracted the 
time spent on vocabulary acquisition from the app. All participants underwent 
structural and functional MRI before and after the intervention. 
Statistical analysis. Behavioral data was analyzed using a 2 (group) x 2 (time) 
mixed ANOVA to detect changes in DMS or associative memory performance. Grey-
matter volume in the language learning group was extracted using a paired t-test, 
10
which was then entered in an exploratory path model to determine the relationship 
between grey-matter volume, baseline characteristics, and training-related gains.
Results. A whole-brain analysis revealed training-related grey-matter increases in 
the right hippocampus and the left occipital lobe for the language group. A group 
x time analysis suggested that this was specific to the language group. Average 
grey-matter volumetric increase was extracted from the hippocampal region-
of-interest and entered into an exploratory path model, predicted by time spent 
training and acquired vocabulary. A first model suggested that time spent training 
was associated with vocabulary acquisition and hippocampal grey-matter change, 
but that acquired vocabulary was not associated with hippocampal grey-matter 
change (Fig 1). In a second model, we included associative memory and DMS 
baseline performance as predictors of time spent training, acquired vocabulary and 
grey-matter change. In this model, DMS was associated with associative memory 
performance, grey-matter change and time spent training. 
Figur 1. The basic path model of the relationship between time spent studying,  vocabulary 
test score, and GM change in the right HC, (A) full model, and (B) pruned model.
Discussion. These findings align with previous findings on language acquisition in 
younger adults (e.g. Mårtensson et al., 2012), albeit in a less select sample. Time 
spent training exhibits a stronger association with hippocampal grey-matter increase 
than do vocabulary acquisition, suggesting that volumetric increases reflect effort 
rather than acquired skill. However, controlling for baseline cognitive functioning 
shows that only pattern separation ability uniquely predicts grey-matter change. 
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3.2 Study II – Foreign language learning in older age 
does not improve memory or intelligence: Evidence 
from a randomized controlled study
Introduction. Engagement in cognitively challenging activities has shown to be 
associated with better cognitive functioning in old age but experimental evidence 
on this association is lacking (Simons et al., 2016). Brain regions engaged in foreign 
language acquisition has shown substantial overlap with brain regions exhibiting 
age-related decline (Raz et al., 2005). Thus, foreign language learning has been 
proposed as a method to combat cognitive decline in old age.
Sample. 169 participants between ages 65–75 were recruited through ads in a local 
newspaper. A total of 160 participants completed the intervention. Participants 
were randomized into either an experimental group (N = 90) or a control group 
(N = 70) stratified on sex, age and baseline associative memory performance. 
Materials and methods. Participants in the language learning condition met twice 
per week for 5 hours each week, for eleven weeks (totaling of 55 hours). During 
classes participants engaged in verbal communication exercises while following 
a textbook at a pace of about one chapter (2-4 pages) per week. Between classes 
participants practiced vocabulary acquisition. Participants in the relaxation train-
ing condition met once per week for 1 hour, for a total of 11 hours. During classes 
they focused on breathing and relaxation exercises. 
Before and after the intervention participants did a cognitive testing battery with 
3 tests of verbal intelligence (analogies, syllogisms and verbal inference), 2 tests 
of spatial intelligence (Raven’s matrices and WASI matrices), 2 tests of working 
memory (numerical updating and N-back), 3 tests of associative memory (word-
word, face-name and picture-picture) and 3 tests of item memory (word, faces, 
pictures). The tests were identical at pre- and post-test. At post-test, the language 
learning group was also given a vocabulary test of 110 words, randomly selected 
from the weekly word lists, to assess their acquired vocabulary. 
A subsample also underwent structural and functional MRI (not reported here). 
Statistical analysis. The hypothesis was that language learning group would show 
larger pre-post gains than the relaxation group. We tested this hypothesis using 
both latent variable modeling and Bayesian model selection. Latent factors were 
formed of each test assumed to measure the same construct. Measurement invari-
ance was tested by imposing increasingly strict constraints on factor loadings 
(weak MI), item intercepts (strong MI) and residual variances (strict MI). We 
estimated a latent change score model for both treatment groups simultaneously. 
The hypothesis of differential change was tested by comparing a model where the 
average change was freely estimated in both groups with a model where average 
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change was constrained to be equal in both groups. We also performed a Bayesian 
linear mixed regression on each observed measure, using Time (Pre vs Post) and 
Group (Language vs relaxation) and their interaction as fixed effects and including 
a random intercept. Bayesian hypothesis testing was done on the Time x Group 
interaction term, using informed half-normal priors. 
Results. The vocabulary test showed that participants in the language group scored 
on average 57 words correct suggesting that they did acquire a basic vocabulary 
during the course. All latent factors passed the test of strict measurement invari-
ance both in terms of absolute and relative fit. While both groups showed pre-post 
improvements, constraining the average change to equality across groups did result 
in significantly worse fit for any of the cognitive domains. This shows no greater 
improvement for the language learning group, and suggest that potential observed 
gains were due to re-test effects (Fig 2). This finding was further corroborated by 
Bayesian hypothesis testing weakly favoring the null hypothesis for all but one 
of the manifest variables. 
Figur 2. Distribution of unit-weighted change (posttest – pretest) scores. Green dots 
denote individual change scores of participants in the language group and blue dots 
denote change scores for the participants in the relaxation group. Black dots and line 
segments denote the median and 1st and 3rd quartiles.
Discussion. Participants in the language learning group did obtain a basic  knowledge 
in the foreign language. We did not find evidence for the hypothesis that taking a 
beginner’s course in a foreign language in older age improves verbal intelligence, 
spatial intelligence, working memory, associative memory or item memory. All 
latent factors exhibited acceptable psychometric properties and our sample size 
was adequate to detect relatively small differences. While the duration of the 
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course was more intense than a typical beginner’s course and included additional 
vocabulary training, it is certainly possible that extended duration or more intense 
practice is necessary in order for language learning to translate into more general 
cognitive benefits. This study is also limited in that we only assess vocabulary and 
no other aspects (e.g. speech comprehension, speech production, grammar) of foreign 
 language acquisition. It may also be that language learning is beneficial for certain 
target groups, such as those with low education or little cognitive stimulation. 
Overall, these results align with findings from similar studies and meta-analyses 
of the literature suggesting fairly limited general benefits of cognitive training. 
3.3 Study III – Education does not affect cognitive 
decline in aging: a Bayesian assessment of the 
association between education and change in 
cognitive performance
Introduction. Cognitive performance decline in aging. Longitudinal studies  suggest 
that decline in fluid abilities begin in early adulthood and episodic memory decline 
in late middle life while crystallized abilities remain relatively preserved even into 
old age (Rönnlund et al., 2005; Schaie, 1994). Educational attainment has a posi-
tive association with level of cognitive functioning but the association between 
educational attainment and rate of cognitive decline remains contested. Previous 
studies on the association between educational attainment and rate of decline 
report mixed findings (Lenehan et al., 2014). One methodological obstacle is the 
application of frequentist methods to assess situations where the null hypothesis 
might be plausible, as in the present case. To address this, we employed Bayesian 
hypothesis testing using informed priors from previous literature. We also explored 
to what extent the effect of education differs across cohorts. 
Sample. This study uses data from the longitudinal cohort-sequential Betula study 
(Nilsson, 1997). In this study we sampled 1707 participants (54% female) aged 
35-80 years with an average educational attainment of 10.2 years. Participants 
were tested on visuospatial ability, semantic knowledge and episodic memory at 
each measurement occasion. 
Statistical analysis. We specified a Bayesian linear mixed model with sex, educa-
tion and cohort as between-subject variables and age as a within-subject variable. 
We also included random intercepts and random linear slopes. Bayesian  hypothesis 
testing requires an explicit specification of the alternative hypothesis. To this 
end we obtained estimates from two previous target articles the similar cognitive 
domains, similar age-range and using similar standardization, which facilitate the 
formulation of informed priors. The prior for the focal parameter, the age × edu-
cation interaction term, is specified as normally distributed around 0 with a vari-
ance equal to 1, 2 or 4 times the observed estimates from the two target articles. 
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Bayesian hypothesis testing is done using the Savage-Dickey method. Inference 
regarding the cohort × education interaction is done using maximum a posteriori 
estimates and 95% highest density intervals. 
Results. Results from the linear mixed model show that higher educational attain-
ment is associated with greater performance on visuospatial ability, semantic 
knowledge and episodic memory but that educational attainment do not alter the 
rate of decline in either of these abilities, as indicated by parallel slopes (Fig 3). 
Contrary to expectation, our results suggest that the effect of education on crystal-
lized abilities might decrease for later cohorts.
Discussion. We replicate the association between educational attainment and level 
of cognitive functioning. This association was stronger for semantic knowledge 
Figure 3. Model-implied growth trajectories for (A) visuospatial ability, (B)  semantic 
knowledge, and (C) episodic memory. Trajectories apply to men born in 1935 with 
3 years more than average education (dashed line), average education (solid line), 
and 3 years less than average education (dotted line).
than for visuospatial ability or episodic memory. Hypothesis testing on the asso-
ciation between educational attainment and rate of decline yields Bayes factors 
close to 1 for visuospatial ability and semantic knowledge, suggesting the data is 
unable to discriminate between the null and the alternative hypothesis. In retro-
spect, this is unsurprising given the precision of the original articles, suggesting 
that our findings should not alter the conclusions from previous articles, namely 
that education had a negligible effect on rate of decline. For episodic memory we 
find slight evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, with more ambitious alterna-
tive hypotheses yielding stronger evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect. 
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3.4 Study IV – Education and age-related decline in 
episodic memory performance: systematic review 
and meta-analysis of longitudinal studies
Introduction. Educational attainment has an established relationship with level of 
cognitive functioning but studies on the association between educational  attainment 
and rate of cognitive decline has reported mixed evidence. In this study we perform a 
meta-analysis of 15 articles reporting on the association between educational attain-
ment and rate of episodic memory decline.
Methods. We searched databases on articles reporting on the association between 
educational attainment and rate of episodic memory decline. From relevant articles 
we transformed each reported estimate to the association between 1 additional year 
of education and episodic memory change (in SDs) per decade, rescaled by baseline 
SD. We performed an inverse-variance weighted random-effects meta-analysis. In 
a subsequent meta-regression we also investigated the moderating effects of age, 
educational attainment or follow-up period. We performed a sensitivity analysis 
by removing outliers with large effect sizes and/or standard errors. Heterogeneity 
was assessed using Cochran’s Q and I2. 
Results. The systematic search identified 15 articles reporting a total of 35 esti-
mates on the association between educational attainment and rate of episodic 
memory decline. The total sample size was N = 92 930. The meta-analytic estimate 
was small and non-significant (β = 0.0021, p = .58), thus not supporting the notion 
that education affects rate of episodic memory decline. Average age, educational 
attainment or follow-up period did not change this conclusion, neither did removal 
of outliers. However, there was considerable heterogeneity across studies. 
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Figure 4. Forest plot of episodic memory meta-analysis, point estimates and 95% 
 confidence intervals. Size of points correspond to weight in meta-analysis.
Discussion. This quantitative meta-analysis converges with other review articles 
(e.g. Lenehan et al., 2014) suggesting no or negligible effect of educational attain-
ment on rate of episodic memory decline in old age. This result seems consistent 
over different tiers of educational attainment, across different ages and does not 
depend on length of follow-up period. While education has a substantial association 
with level of cognitive function, e.g. episodic memory, its effect on rate of decline 
is negligible, meaning we should perhaps look for other causes of individual dif-
ferences in rate of cognitive decline.
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4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Summary of results
The first half of this thesis presents findings from two experimental studies: one study 
on the neural correlates of language acquisition in younger adults (Study I) and one 
study on the cognitive benefits of foreign language learning in older adults (Study II). 
The second half of the thesis contains findings on the association between educational 
attainment and rate of decline: one original longitudinal study (Study III) and one 
meta-analysis (Study IV). Study I found that grey-matter volume increases in the 
right hippocampus was greater for younger adults participating in an eight-week 
language learning course compared to those partaking in an active control condi-
tion. Further, exploratory path analyses suggested that participant pattern separation 
ability at baseline significantly predicted grey-matter volume increase, controlling 
for time spent training on a vocabulary acquisition task. Study II found that eleven 
weeks of similar language training, with an emphasis on vocabulary acquisition, in 
older adults did not improve neither associative memory, item memory, working 
memory, spatial intelligence nor verbal intelligence compared to an active control 
group. Study III found that educational attainment did not alter the linear rate of 
cognitive decline in either episodic memory, visuospatial reasoning or semantic 
knowledge. In a similar vein, Study IV found that the meta-analytic estimate of 
educational attainment on rate of episodic memory decline is negligible.
4.2 Brain plasticity
In Study I we investigated the neural correlates associated with foreign language 
learning and found that grey-matter increase in the right hippocampus correlated 
with time investment, but not with acquired vocabulary. Our interpretation is that 
this grey-matter change might reflect plastic changes, but understanding the tem-
poral dynamics of plastic changes at various stages is of course crucial. Wenger et 
al. (2016) has provided some experimental evidence for the temporal dynamics of 
plastic changes following motor skill learning. Their findings suggest that plastic 
changes occur relatively quickly and are fairly transient, occurring over the course 
of a few weeks, after which renormalization begins. While we are unable to address 
the temporal dynamics of plastic changes using a simple pre-post design, we can 
speculate that renormalization had been on-going for some time at the time of the 
second measurement occasion. It should also be noted that the findings of Wenger 
et al. (2016) apply to motor skill learning, and that the same pattern might not apply 
to higher cognitive processes, such as language learning. 
More generally, it may be that plastic changes are most prominent during initial 
phases of skill acquisition, which is arguably when the most rapid learning occurs. 
During later stages it might be more a matter of honing skills, which might involve 
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functional changes rather than macroscopic structural changes, and that once the 
learning curve “levels off” renormalization begins. Furthermore, for complex tasks 
involving multiple cognitive functions, such as language learning, plastic changes 
may occur in different brain regions at different times. 
4.3 Future prospects for cognitive training
In Study II we performed a relatively well-powered randomized controlled trial 
investigating the cognitive benefits of foreign language learning in old age. As we 
modelled foreign language acquisition as associative memory training, the most 
plausible benefit would be improved associative memory performance among for-
eign language learners. However, our findings do not support the hypothesis that 
participating in a moderately intense foreign language learning course improves 
neither memory nor intelligence, at least not in the short-term. 
Proponents of language learning as cognitive engagement may point out that the 
observed lack of cognitive benefit was a result of insufficient intensity or duration, 
e.g. counterfactual claims of the sort “Had the course been longer (or more intense) 
then we might have seen improvements”. This is, in a sense, necessarily true, simply 
because of the meaning of the word “sufficient”, as anything that does not in fact 
bring about a proposed change can be said to be insufficient for doing so. Thus, 
claims of insufficiency are more like “grammatical remarks” (cf. Wittgenstein, 
1953) on the usage of the word “sufficient”, rather than substantive suggestions, 
insofar as they are not expressed in precise quantities (e.g. hours, days, or weeks). 
Claiming that improvements occur after, say, 16 weeks is a testable claim; claim-
ing that improvements would occur after an indeterminate “longer period” is not. 
Therefore, future research should aim to specify, in quantifiable terms, the condi-
tions under which cognitive improvements are expected to occur, i.e. what course 
duration and course intensity is necessary; what achieved level of proficiency in 
the foreign language is required; and what population the intervention should be 
aimed at. As long as these conditions are not specified, critics can always resort 
to counterfactual scenarios when confronted with disconfirming evidence. 
On the other hand, it is certainly possible that engaging in more intense language 
training over a longer period of time would have yielded tangible results, but this 
raises questions about the feasibility and applicability of such an intervention. 
If cognition could be improved but only after several months or years of very 
intense language studies, would it be of any use, as very few (if any) would take 
part in such an intervention? My guess is “no”, as engagement in such activities 
is costly and more importantly, time-consuming. Any potential cognitive benefits 
are, at best, a positive side effect of an otherwise stimulating and joyful activity 
that some people engage in anyhow. 
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In a broader perspective, the feasibility of broad cognitive improvements through 
short-term, focal interventions might be questioned. In old age, the cognitive life 
course trajectory is determined by more than 60 years of ontogenetic experience (in 
addition to thousands of years of phylogenetic evolution) and it might be somewhat 
naïve to expect that a simple, three-month intervention would drastically alter that 
trajectory, lest the intervention entails a much more radical procedure (e.g. surgical 
interventions; the best way to permanently lost weight is amputation). Even if one 
might occasionally observe short-term benefits from such interventions, these are 
likely to be transient. 
In a sense, plasticity and stability trade-off against each other: a completely  plastic 
system cannot retain information, while a completely stable system cannot incorporate 
new knowledge (Mermillod, Bugaiska, & Bonin, 2013). As such, one can specu-
late if reduced brain plasticity in old age might actually be a neural optimization 
strategy, albeit with some negative side effects, as with increasing age maintaining 
and preserving what’s left becomes more important than acquiring new skills. This 
might be reflected in the relative preservation of crystallized abilities (i.e. relying 
on already acquired knowledge) while fluid abilities, involved in acquiring new 
skills, decline in aging. Nevertheless, while brain plasticity is reduced in old age, 
the holy grail of cognitive aging research is to find out how to reverse this process 
through experimental manipulation. 
4.4 Educational attainment and cognitive functioning
It is probably safe to say that going to school has a drastic impact on our cognitive 
functioning. Education is, in a sense, the ultimate cognitive intervention, lasting for 
many years and being progressively more challenging, thus giving ample opportunity 
for people to experience that mismatch between functional supply and environ-
mental demand necessary to induce plastic changes. This thesis adds to the converg-
ing evidence that the main benefit of going to school is exerted through its effect on 
cognitive functioning in early life and young adulthood, i.e. during a period when 
the brain is more malleable and receptive. There is some evidence to suggest that 
going additional educational attainment does have causal influence on intelligence 
(Lager et al., 2016; Ritchie & Tucker-drob, 2018; but see Kremen et al., 2019;). The 
next question is what the relationship looks like in the lower and upper end of the 
educational range. It is likely that an extra year at the bottom end, e.g. going from 
6 to 7 years, has larger benefit than an extra year at the upper end, e.g. going from 
20 to 21 years of education. While the exact nature is yet to be determined, it is not 
unlikely that educational attainment suffers from diminishing returns. 
It is also not known for whom educational attainment is most beneficial. The effect 
of education likely interacts with a large number of factors, such as parental socio-
economic status or innate cognitive ability. One possibility – the compensation sce-
nario – is those with low intelligence will benefit more from additional schooling, 
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possibly because they have more to gain. Another possibility (perhaps gloomy albeit 
more plausible given the far-reaching effects of intelligence) is the magnification 
scenario, whereby those with already high IQ will benefit more from additional 
schooling. This pattern has been observed for health literacy (Gottfredson & 
Deary, 2004) in that not only are more intelligent people healthier and live longer 
in general, but they are also more cost-efficient at consuming medical treatment 
once they become sick. 
Finally, theories of cognitive decline must be updated to incorporate converging 
evidence that the overall effect of educational attainment on cognitive decline is 
negligible, and possibly non-existent. There might be 99 factors that are associated 
with the rate of cognitive decline in old age, but education ain’t one. 
4.5  Methodological considerations
Over the course of my doctoral education I have found that I tend to gravitate 
towards methodological rather than substantive issues (sometimes to the dismay 
and frustration of my supervisors). The following sections do not concern cogni-
tive aging per se, but apply to research more generally – in particular, statistical 
inference, philosophy of science and the prospect of psychology as a quantitative 
science. 
4.5.1 Frequentist inference
The most common framework for statistical inference in biomedical research is 
a confused amalgamation of frequentist statistics, i.e. using null hypothesis signi-
ficance testing (NHST) and p-values. Frequentism is so called because the con-
ception of probability in this framework is defined in terms of long run frequencies, 
or proportions. Inference is made on the basis of the p-value, which is the prob-
ability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme as the obtained test statistic, 
conditional on the truth of the null hypothesis and other assumptions (Wasserstein 
& Lazar, 2016). Thus, the p-value is a measure of incompatibility between observed 
data and a proposed statistical model, the null hypothesis. The test statistic can 
be thought of as a summary measure, e.g. the ratio of the observed estimate (the 
“signal”) and the associated error (the “noise”). If the signal-to-noise ratio is large 
enough (e.g. close to 2) the resulting p-value is small enough to warrant rejection 
of the null hypothesis, implicitly in favor of the alternative hypothesis (which is 
the hypothesis the researcher typically entertains). In NHST, two kinds of errors 
can be made: one can falsely declare the presence of an effect which is absent in 
the population (a “false alarm”, or a type 1 error) or one can falsely declare the 
absence of an effect that is present in the population (a “miss”, or a type 2 error). 
A principal goal of frequentist inference is to put an upper limit on the propor-
tion of type 1 errors, e.g. the proportion of times we incorrectly reject a true null 
hypothesis. This limit is set by α-level, conventionally at 5%. 
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Significance testing have been notoriously criticized since their inception due to 
interpretational difficulties of p-values (Goodman, 2009) and confidence intervals 
(Hoekstra et al., 2014), that the underlying logic is flawed (Cohen, 1994) and that 
the foundational assumption of a true null hypothesis always is false (Tukey, 1991). 
Schmidt & Hunter (1997) called the enterprise “thoroughly discredited” (p. 37) 
and claimed it “never makes a positive contribution” (p. 62). While proponents 
of significance testing agree that researchers routinely misinterpret the p-value, 
they sometimes insist that there is nothing wrong with the p-value per se and that 
its statistical definition is sound. After all, “guns don’t kill people, people do”. 
P-values are often misinterpreted as the probability that the results are due to 
chance; the probability that the null hypothesis is true; that the obtained result 
is a type 1 error; or as the converse probability (1-p) that the results will repli-
cate in a future study (Greenland et al., 2016). Most would agree that the above 
quantities would be very useful to have, yet they do not correspond to (and have 
little in common with) the formal definition of the p-value. Those quantities are 
available, but only for a price, and not everyone is willing to pay that price (see 
“priors” below). Given that the p-value is confused with the above quantities, it 
is no wonder that p-values remain popular. 
NHST has also been criticized for invalid logical inference (Schmidt & Hunter, 
1997). Informally, the logic of NHST is this: if the null hypothesis is true, the 
observed result is unlikely; but this result did occur; therefore, the null hypothesis 
is unlikely (Cohen, 1994). While this line of reasoning is suggestive and remini-
scent of a valid logical form called modus tollens, it is rendered invalid by the 
introduction of probabilistic statements (e.g. “unlikely”). 
Null hypothesis significance testing is sometimes also presented as being falsi-
ficationist, in that the aim is to reject a proposed statistical model. Falsificationism 
(Popper, 1959) is a variant of the problem of induction (Hume, 1748) in that there 
is an asymmetry between confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence: confirmatory 
evidence cannot differentiate between hypotheses, only disconfirming evidence can. 
Therefore, data inconsistent with predictions are far more informative than data 
consistent with predictions, so researchers learn more from getting the world wrong 
than from getting the world right. This is unintuitive, and while many researchers 
pay lip-service to the notion of falsifiability it is rarely applied in practice. 
However, while falsification is a laudable goal, the connection to significance testing 
is fatally flawed. A fundamental problem is that substantive psychological theories 
very rarely makes precise numerical predictions. They are, at best, formulated as 
directional hypotheses (e.g. “A will be larger than B”) without specifying how 
much larger. The only precise prediction is the one made by the null hypothesis 
(which predicts a difference of 0), which very rarely is of any substantive interest 
and is typically not the hypothesis the researcher entertains. Furthermore, the term 
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“hypothesis testing” can be deceiving in that it suggests that the hypothesis being 
tested is a substantive hypothesis. Let’s be clear: the hypothesis being tested is not 
determined by the mental state of the researcher, i.e. what hypothesis the researcher 
thinks he or she is testing, but is strictly determined by the statistical test (which 
is invariably the nil null hypothesis of no difference). This confusion is reflected 
in formulations like “We tested the hypothesis that… [e.g.] by a paired t-test” and 
interpreting a significant finding as evidence for the hypothesis. Thus, researchers 
rarely, if ever, attempt to falsify substantive theories, because substantive theories 
do not make precise predictions. 
One of the most common claims is that null hypothesis significance testing is 
futile because taken literally, the null hypothesis is always false (Tukey, 1991). 
While this may seem trivial it critically undermines the entire enterprise of NHST. 
First, the null hypothesis is sometimes true simply by construction, e.g. at baseline 
following proper randomization. One of the main purposes of randomization is 
to induce independence between treatment condition and other covariates, so that 
background characteristics cannot interfere with treatment assignment and thereby 
does not bias the estimator of the average treatment effect (Deaton et al., 2017). 
Incidentally, this is also why significance testing of baseline differences in ran-
domized controlled trials (RCTs) is nonsensical. Significance testing of sample 
means is done to reject the null hypothesis that the means of the populations 
from which the samples were drawn are equal. However, in an RCT there are no 
two distinct populations, as everyone is sampled from the same population, and 
group membership is artificially created through randomization. Thus, rejecting 
the null hypothesis on the basis of significant baseline differences in an RCT is 
tantamount to rejecting the necessary truth that the population mean is equal to 
the population mean, i.e. that x = x. This is clearly absurd (Altman, 1985). Still, 
p-values routinely accompany baseline between-group comparison in RCTs, and 
are routinely requested by reviewers. Worse, variables exhibiting significant dif-
ferences following proper randomization are subsequently included as covariates 
which leads to unknown error rates. 
Second, we may grant that the null hypothesis is true also for certain non-trivial, 
empirical relationships out there in the world. If we accept Tukey’s claim – that 
no parameter is ever truly zero in the population, or that it is always different from 
zero at some decimal place – it is not clear why we grant that special status only 
to the number zero. As an example, consider the following: “people with blue 
eyes” and “people with brown eyes” refer to fairly well-defined populations. Let 
H1 and H2 denote the average height (in centimeters) of people in these popula-
tions. H1 and H2 are going to be different to some decimal place, for a number 
of reasons – perhaps substantive, perhaps random – so the difference H1-H2 is 
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going to be different from 0 to some decimal place. Thus, Tukey would arguably 
dismiss the null hypothesis H1-H2 = 0 cm a priori. But if a difference of exactly 
0 cm can be dismissed, the same can be said of a difference of 2 cm, or 2.1 cm, or 
2.159 cm, or any proposed exact parameter value; there’s nothing special about 
the value 0 in that regard. Taken to the extreme, the conclusion must be that the 
difference H1-H2 does not even denote a well-defined quantity, because the mass 
probability of any point value is zero. 
Third, a direct consequence of Tukey’s claim is Paul Meehl’s conjecture of the 
“crud factor” (Meehl, 1990); the assumption that everything affects everything 
else to some (miniscule) extent. On this view, arguably there is no such thing as 
“overfitting a model” because every non-zero relationship is to be modeled and 
estimated. This assumption makes for a very complex and inflated ontology, and 
ontological parsimony is a virtue that perhaps should not be readily dismissed. 
There is of course nothing that says that the world cannot be of infinite complexity. 
But the role of science is not to mirror an infinitely complex world, but to provide 
useful models of the world, and our scientific models of the world cannot be of 
infinite complexity if they are to be at all useful. 
Fourth, accepting the premise that the null is never literally true also proves 
fatal to the fundamental purpose of significance testing, which is to put an upper 
limit on the proportion of type 1 errors (i.e. the erroneous rejection of a true null 
hypothesis). If we accept that the null hypothesis is never true, then we also have 
to accept that type 1 errors are impossible because they can only occur when the 
null hypothesis is true. And it is not clear why we should be concerned about 
limiting something that never has a chance to occur. Ironically then, we are faced 
with a paradox: if we agree with Tukey in that the null hypothesis is never liter-
ally true, this necessarily implies at least one true null hypothesis, namely the 
meta-scientific hypothesis that the total number of false positives in the literature 
is 0%. At least that’s good news. 
It seems that we may either accept Tukey’s claim that there are no true null hypo-
theses or endorse the ambition of putting an upper limit on the proportion of type 1 
errors, but we cannot consistently entertain both of these ideas simultaneously. If 
we accept the presence of true null hypotheses, ideally we should also employ a 
consistent method of inference that will arrive at the correct answer in the large 
sample limit (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Significance 
testing is inconsistent in that it will converge on the right answer only when the 
null hypothesis is false, not when it’s true. If this (somewhat contrived) reasoning 
is correct, it seems that significance testing should not be employed regardless of 
the truth or falsify of the null hypothesis: if the null is true, you will never reach 
that conclusion using an inconsistent method, and if the null is false, there is no 
risk of a type 1 error. 
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Furthermore, finding support for the null hypothesis is pivotal in establishing invari-
ances. Showing that things do not differ across different levels of an independent 
variable is an important goal in science (Gallistel, 2009), such as proving that 
effects are additive (i.e the absence of an interaction). In Study III, the substantive 
hypothesis of passive reserve coincides with the statistical null hypothesis, i.e. that 
educational attainment is not associated with the rate of cognitive decline. Another 
case of establishing invariances occurs in structural equation modelling (SEM) 
when assessing measurement invariance, where the researcher aims to show that 
imposing path constraints on measurement parameters do not lead to worse fit, as 
indicated by p > .05. Normally one is not allowed to accept the null hypothesis 
based on p > .05, yet within the context of SEM this is somehow deemed legitimate. 
Originally, built into the notions of type 1 and type 2 errors was the idea that one 
should balance the two different kinds of errors, or weight their relative cost against 
each other (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). In practice, however, every researcher sets 
the acceptable type 1 error rate to 5%. For an individual researcher the cost of 
making a type 1 error is arguably almost non-existent, while the potential benefit 
of making a type 1 error includes a potential publication in a high impact journal. 
Conversely, the cost of a type 2 error (e.g. failure to detect a true effect) is much 
higher, as it may indicate sloppiness on part of the researcher (e.g. lack of “flair”; 
Baumeister, 2016) while conferring no obvious benefit. This might contribute to 
the alleged large proportion of type 1 errors in the literature (e.g. Ioannidis, 2005). 
But the fundamental problem with p-values is ultimately a practical matter in how 
they guide data-analytic decision making. Scientists have been conditioned to obtain 
statistical significance, and the first thing we do when looking at data analysis 
output is to seek asterisks in the statistical significance column (“star-gazing”; 
cf. McElreath, 2016). A near-significant result of p = .071 bothers us much more 
than p = .71 in that we try to transmute the former into a significant result through 
creative analysis and post-hoc reasoning, while the latter make us look elsewhere. 
We also rarely know the functional form of a relationship between two variables 
with arbitrary scaling, so who’s to say that the underlying relationship is strictly 
linear rather than a complex polynomial, or that the cut-off for an outlier should 
be 2 rather than 1.5 standard deviations? A researcher faces many choices during 
data analysis, leading to a multitude of “researcher degrees of freedom” (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). When “exploring the data set” (a euphemism for 
trying out various analytical methods) obtaining statistical significance for one 
analytic choice over another can itself be interpreted as validation that one is on 
the right track: e.g. “using this transformation, or this factor analytic rotation, or 
including this covariate, or excluding these participants, yields statistical signifi-
cance, which means I’m picking up a signal, so there’s something there”. 
Data-analytic decision making on the basis of p-values has been labeled “p-hacking” 
(Simmons et al., 2011) or analogous to a walk down the “garden of forking paths” 
(Gelman & Loken, 2013). I think the latter is preferable because “p-hacking” is an 
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active verb with connotations implying something sinister on part of the researcher, 
whereas the metaphor of the garden of forking suggest blissful ignorance rather 
than malicious intent (c.f. Hanlon’s razor). But like the road to hell, the garden of 
forking paths is paved with good intentions.
The problem is that once we find what we’re looking for, then we stop looking. 
While this makes sense in everyday situations, e.g. when looking for one’s mis-
placed keys, in significance testing it undermines the interpretation of the p-value. 
The definition of the p-value is based on counter-factual and hypothetical long-run 
frequencies of what would happen if we were to repeat the same experiment (and 
analysis) a very large number of times. Given that data-analytic choices depend on 
the outcome of certain statistical tests, it is not even clear what “the same experi-
ment” means, because the sampling space is not uniquely determined. In the next 
data analysis of an identical experiment, different data-analytical choices would 
be made due to idiosyncratic properties of the data set. 
The prospect of pre-registration (of planned data collection and data analysis) has 
received wide spread attention as a possible remedy to such data-analytic flex-
ibility. Pre-registrations can also help distinguishing between confirmatory and 
exploratory research. It can also help with yielding valid p-value, e.g. by fixating 
the reference for what “the same experiment” means. However, pre-registration 
can only help insofar as they actually restrict researcher degrees of freedom and 
limit data-analytic flexibility, and not all pre-registrations are created equal; there 
is currently large variability in the quality and scope of pre-registrations (Veldkamp 
et al., 2019). On the one end of the spectrum are pre-registrations specifying how 
data collection, data cleaning and data analysis is to be done once the data is in, down 
to the level of supplying pre-specified analysis code, along with precise numerical 
hypotheses. On the other end of the spectrum are pre-registrations  stating direc-
tional predictions and nothing else. At worst, insufficiently precise pre-registrations 
allow the researcher to pass off the research as being pre-registered, with all the 
potential benefits of doing so, while keeping the actual pre-registration vague 
enough so as to still allow substantial analytic flexibility. An extreme position, 
though not entirely unreasonable, would be that all experiments that are not pre-
registered (i.e. almost all research conducted prior to 2012 when pre-registration 
took off) should be deemed exploratory. There is of course nothing wrong with 
exploratory research, as long as it is presented as such. Indeed, given the lack of 
precision in psychological hypotheses, perhaps we would be better off conducting 
only exploratory research until we come up with a theory that’s actually testable.
4.5.2 Bayesian inference
My disenchantment with frequentist statistics occupied much of my PhD and led 
me towards the most common alternative to frequentist inference, namely Bayesian 
statistics. One fundamental difference between these two inferential paradigms 
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lies in the concept of probability: while frequentists conceive of probability as a 
limiting proportion, e.g. a long run frequency, Bayesians interpret probability as 
quantifying degrees of belief. This latter probability is represented by the intro-
duction of a prior distribution. 
Another difference between the two is that frequentists calculate the probability 
of observed data conditional on a given parameter value (“the model is fixed, the 
data is random”) while Bayesians calculate the probability of different parameter 
values, conditional on observed data (“the data is fixed, the model is random”). 
The prior distribution of the parameter is combined with the likelihood from the 
data, resulting in a posterior distribution of the parameter. 
Whereas frequentist inference use p-values for selection, and point estimates and 
confidence intervals for estimation, Bayesian statistics use Bayes factors for model 
selection, and posterior means and highest density intervals for estimation. Thus, 
Bayesian inference can accommodate probability statements pertaining to hypo-
theses and parameter estimates, such as “the probability that the null hypothesis is 
true” and “there is a 95% probability that the true value lies within the confidence 
limits”. Such statements are not possible within the frequentist framework, as 
parameters do not have probabilities associated with them (a hypothesis is either 
true or false, and a parameter value either lies within the confidence limit or it 
doesn’t – it is not a matter of probability to a frequentist). 
Yet another difference is that within the frequentist framework, parameter estima-
tion and hypothesis testing are two sides of the same coin (e.g. the null  hypothesis 
is rejected if the estimate is about twice as large as the standard error). In the 
Bayesian framework parameter estimation and hypothesis testing are quite differ-
ent, in particular with regards to the role of the prior. In parameter estimation, the 
influence of the prior on the resulting posterior is quickly diminished as more data 
accumulates (“the swamping of the prior”). In hypothesis testing, such “swamping” 
doesn’t occur as the role of the prior is to represent a formalization of the alterna-
tive hypothesis, and thus is never rendered obsolete. This makes the specification 
of the prior distribution pivotal in Bayesian hypothesis testing, while it is much 
less important in parameter estimation (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). 
Whereas the p-value is infamous for being difficult to interpret, Bayes factors are 
fairly straightforward: they are the ratio of the probability of the data under two 
competing models. A Bayes factor of 5 simply means that the observed data is 
5 times more likely under one model than under a competing model. One advantage 
of Bayesian hypothesis testing is the ability to quantify evidence in favor of the 
null hypothesis, seen in Study III (and somewhat in Study II). Employed within 
the context of null hypothesis testing, the Bayes factor can be easily approximated 
using the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014) by dividing 
the ratio of the prior and the posterior at the parameter value of interest, e.g. 0. 
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As such, Bayes factors are marginal measures of evidence suggesting how one 
should update one’s belief after seeing new data. An example of this is the find-
ings in Study III, suggesting Bayes factors close to 1 meaning that one should not 
change one’s belief at all (given that one agrees with the prior specification). We 
also show that if one accepts a vaguer prior (corresponding to larger effects on 
the role of educational attainment on the rate of episodic memory decline) there 
is increasing evidence against the alternative hypothesis. 
One can utilize Bayesian statistics for many reasons. One reason is computational 
tractability. Some hierarchical models involving a large number of parameters 
and few observations for each level, and are so complex that they cannot easily 
be estimated using frequentist methods. In contrast, Bayesian implementations 
of such models might be straight forward due to the introduction of regularizing 
priors. Another advantage is that the prior distribution allows the Bayesian to 
explicitly bring external information, i.e. previous research, to the model, thus 
formalizing the cumulative nature of science. A frequentist, on the other hand, 
leaves previous research at the door as soon as he begins data analysis, in that he 
always starts out from a point of ignorance, only informed by the current data set. 
This ability to formally “stand on the shoulders of giants” is especially beneficial 
in small sample research, when gathering data is expensive or samples are rare 
(e.g. in studying rare diseases). 
This thesis consists of neither overly complex models, nor particularly small sample 
research. In both articles where Bayesian methods have been employed (Study II 
and III) the same models can easily be estimated using frequentist methods, and 
would probably have arrived at similar conclusions. The posterior distributions are 
informed mainly by the likelihood from the available data, using uninformative 
priors for all parameters except those subject to hypothesis testing. 
Instead, it was my interest in the philosophy of science, along with a very open-
minded main supervisor, that prompted the use of Bayesian statistics in studies 
II and III. The excursion to learn an alternative statistical paradigm has not been 
altogether productive and has arguably taken an excessive amount of time from 
substantive research (which is mirrored in the present thesis). My own experi-
ence is that the vast majority of researchers who employ frequentist methods do 
so not because of a reasoned theoretical argument in favor of significance testing 
(incidentally, I have yet to see one) but because of tradition and pragmatics, e.g. 
that’s what introductory statistics courses teach. This might also explain why calls 
to abandon significance testing has fallen on deaf ears, as it is difficult to reason 
someone out of a position that they did not reason themselves into in the first place. 
Yet another, perhaps bigger, practical obstacle for the dissemination of Bayesian 
statistics is the obnoxious missionary zeal and smugness newly-convert Bayesians 
tend to flaunt. And with friends like that you don’t need enemies.
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